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THE POSITION OF THE CHURCH THROUGHOUT THE CHANGES 
IN CZECHOSLOVAK SOCI~TY 
By Jakub Trojan 
Dr. Jakub Trojan (Church of the Czech Brethren) is the dean and professor of 
systematic theology at the Protestant Theological School of Charles University in 
Prague, Czech Republic. He received his doctorate in systematic theology from the 
Comenius Theological School and he has a graduate degree in Economics from the 
School of Economics in Prague. From 1974 to 1990, he was deprived of the 
permission to be a pastor by the Czechoslovak government and was one of the original 
signers of Charter 77. His articles appeared in previous issues of this periodical. 
I. 
In.February, 1948, the Communist Party assumed power in Czechoslovakia following a 
cabinet crisis which lasted several days. Immediately it enforced a number of political and 
social measures that began to change the social system from its very foundations. Radical 
changes were made in all areas of ownership; initially this concerned industry, trade and 
banking, and after the beginning of the 1950s to an ever increasing degree, agriculture. The 
process of nationalization of large, medium and small companies and businesses, the 
dispossession of land in agriculture and the involuntary establishment of so-called United 
Farming Communities was completed for the most part by the second half of the decade and 
legally consummated with the passage of the new constitution of Czechoslovakia in 1960, 
when the country was declared a socialist republic allied to the Soviet Union. 
However, unlike the other satellites in the Soviet block (East Germany, Poland, Hungary, 
Romania, and Bulgaria), socialism did not gain the upper hand in Czechoslovakia by mere 
external force; the idea of social injustice and the equality of citizens without conspicuous 
differences in ownership had been alive in our nation for decades, ever since the end of the 
nineteenth century. Another contributing factor was a positive bias toward Russia which was 
seen as the land of our Slavonic brothers. Even after its adoption of a bolshevic orientation 
at the close of the 1920s, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia held a strong position 
within the democratic system. During World War II, it was engaged to a significant extent 
in the resistance government. The post-war change in Czechoslovak foreign policy, agreed 
to by all the parties of the National Front, including even non-socialists like the People's 
18 
Party in Bohemia and Moravia and the Democratic Party in Slovakia, as well as by President 
Eduard Benes, also played to the Communists' advantage. The failure of the western powers, 
Great Britain and France, the closest allies of Czechoslovakia during the period between the 
wars and the guarant9rs of her independence since 1918, was still a vivid and painful 
memory. At Munich, the British and French had signed a humiliating agreement with Hitler 
and Fascist Italy which they forced upon Czechoslovakia and which immediately resulted in 
considerable territorial concessions to Germany (autumn, 1938) and shortly thereafter, in the 
German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia (March 1939). The broad spectrum of post-
war Czechoslovakia, restored to its original borders of 1937, adopted a pro-Soviet position 
quite naturally, for it was regarded as having defeated the enemy and liberating the land. 
The Communist Party exploited the anti-German attitude of the population to perfection, 
demanding immediate expulsion of the sizeable German minority (around 3 million) from 
regions where they had lived for as long as anyone could remember. It also gained support 
by emphasizing the sacrifices made by the Soviet Union in fighting for our liberation. The 
standing of non-Communist parties was shaken by the mere fact that the people associated 
their pro-western, albeit democratic, orientation with the betrayal at Munich and the . 
depression of the 1930s which had brought with it nearly a million unemployed, as well as 
other unresolved social problems of the First Republic (1918-1939). 
The self -confident, cultural and intellectual strata of the population seeking fundamental 
changes in the system were attracted to the propaganda of the Communists, while the 
restoration platform of the democratic parties received a cool reception and could scarcely 
compete for their favor. In the sensitive area of agriculture policy the Communists won 
popularity by promising land to those who worked on it. In the context of that time this 
appeared as an attractive slogan. Owners of large farms were portrayed as parasitic exploiters 
of paid labor, similar to their colleagues in trade and industry. Therefore it is hardly 
surprising that the Communists and Social Democrats won more than 50 percent of the vote 
in the first free post-war election. This victory of the left reflected primarily the desire of 
the majority' of the population for greater social security, to be accompanied by the necessity 
to carry out structural changes which would penetrate into the realm of ownership. Such 
changes occurred immediately after the Communists acquired absolute hegemony by means 
.of their adroit maneuvering in 1940. 
II. 
From the birth of the modern Czechoslovakia, churches remained more or less on the 
periphery of social events. Until the beginning of the war in 1939, the majority Catholic 
church found it difficult to recover from its weakened position incurred by centuries-old 
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cooperation with the Austrian monarchy. After 1918 more than two million Catholics 
withdrew to join the newly founded national Czechoslovak Church, or the Evangelical 
Church of Czech Brethren (ECCB), or even to remain without any church affiliation at all, 
due to a post-war wave of secularization. Enfeebled in its theology and church-life, Czech 
Catholicism began to acquire a new self -confidence initially in the cultural realm and later 
in a political context during the Munich crisis. During the war it rather successfully aspired 
to be the defender of national identity, even at the cost of problematizing the policy of 
Masaryk which had been wholly acceptable to the public throughout the entire period of the 
First Republic. 
Protestant churches in Bohemia and Moravia had traditionally been in the minority. 
Even the largest, the Evangelical Church of Czech Brethren, was numerically only a fraction 
of what the majority church could claim (Catholics: approximately 8 million, ECCB: 
250,000). However, even as a minority, it made a notable impact on the history of the 
country. In the first years of statehood, as it freed itself for the first time from the position 
as a church which had only been tolerated, and experienced the favor of political leaders-
-in particular of President Thomas G. Masaryk--through systematic mission and cultural 
efforts it hoped to assert the moral and spiritual postulates of the Czech Republic on a 
national scale. Its desire was that the Czech nation become once again the nation of Huss, 
rooted in the truth of Christ, devoted to the Scripture, faithful to its spiritual heritage. From 
the pulpit and in church publications it conscientiously strove to connect basic biblical motifs 
with the social problems which had begun to develop dramatically at the close of the 1920s, 
during the Depression, and after Hitler's accession to power in neighboring Germany. But 
despite these and other similar efforts, it remained on the margin. Other churches fared no 
better. In general Christianity in Czechoslovakia offered no program which would have 
addressed all areas of life, both personal and societal. There was an obvious closed-
mindedness and an inability to grasp the most profound questions and problems of the 
modern world as it was becoming increasingly secularized. Ideas which could have borne any 
weight were lacking. What prevailed was fruitless ecclesiasticy, manifested in Catholicism 
by empty ceremoniality and in Protestantism by a gradual escape into congregational 
seclusion with a judgmental attitude toward the world. 
Not even after World War II in the decisive period from 1945 to 1948 did the churches 
stand in the forefront of the struggle for a new spiritual and moral obligation, unable to 
present the public with a well-thought-out conception as to how to solve burning domestic 
and international problems. At best, when they did venture out beyond the walls of their 
churches and cathedrals, they pled for tolerance and loyal discipline and encouraged people 
to orient themselves around fundamental values. In principle, however, the churches were 
unprepared for the enormous changes which post-war developments brought to all aspects 
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of life. Let it be repeated: we are talking about changes which had deep domestic roots and 
were not enforced upon us from the outside alone. 
The churches were also unprepared for the fundamental turning point which occurred 
in February, 1948. From the very outset, it was obvious that the changes which were to take 
'~ 
place would inevitably have a profound effect on religion and the life of the churches, and 
indeed, they swiftly ensued. As early as October, 1949, under Communist pressure, the 
highest legislative body enacted laws which were to govern state policy regarding the church 
for what turned out to be 40 long years. Without allowing the churches to present their own 
views on the subject, much less persuade, the state proclaimed its decision to assume the 
burden of paying the salaries of all the clergy in all the churches. Of course, prior to this, 
all church property had been nationalized. The Catholic church was most affected since it 
was one of the largest landowners. Another provision of this legislation gave the state the 
sole right to grant permission to perform church service and ministry on all levels, 
significantly limiting the free choice or appointment of clergy according to internal church 
order. This meant a marked step backward from the situation which had prevailed in the 
democratic order of the First Republic and in many aspects even from that of the period of 
the Austrian monarchy. It enabled state officials to control the church in one of its most 
sensitive spots for decades. What is more, neither the laws passed in 1949 and thereafter, nor 
the constitution of 1960 guaranteed unhindered development of church life. Instead they 
compelled the churches into dependency on a state bureaucracy which was essentially run by 
the party apparatus and security agents of the Ministry of Interior, all in harmony with 
militantly atheistic propaganda. 
After seizing power and liquidating their political opponents in other parties, the major 
concern of the Communists became the disposition of the potentially dangerous opposition 
on the side of what they were convinced was a threat, the Catholic church. Unlike in 
Slovakia, in Czech society a certain mistrust of Catholics prevailed, especially among the 
older generation. Young people were significantly influenced by post-war developments, 
which placed the Communist Party and the Left in a favorable light. In addition to this 
outward propaganda, however much it might have simplified the situation, the minds of the 
people were touched by the internal logic of developments as a whole which pointed to 
radical socio-political transformations for ideological reasons. These were anti-western, 
largely anti-Christian, because--and this was where that internal logic was clearly and 
unequivocally headed--the Soviet Union was built on atheist foundations. In the Czech 
environment, long before replete with secularizing tendencies, these circumstances tended 
to reinforce the non-church, if not frankly anti-church orientation of the majority of the 
population. 
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The principle aim of the Communists was to isolate the Catholic hierarchy from the 
masses of believers. Still taking advantage of the aftermath of the thrust against the 
congregation of bishops, the government adopted the tactical maneuver of pretending that 
the attack on leading representatives of the Catholic church was not an attack on religion as 
such nor by any means on the church itself. 
Protestants were even allowed to establish new congregations during the 1950s, arousing 
the false hope that they were to be counted upon to morally and spiritually nurture society,· 
as the regime proclaimed for purely tactical reasons. The same strategy was employed to win 
over the lower ranking Catholic clergy and their ordinary parish members. 
A concentrated attack, however, was directed against the Vatican, with propaganda which 
classified it as belonging to the imperialistic camp. People within the church found 
themselves under the pressure of the authorities who alleged they were submissive 
instruments of Rome. Methods in this conflict ranged from administrative manipulation to 
outright violence on the part of the state. Monastic orders were dissolved. Their members 
were sent away to prison or military work camps for years, along with others who for one 
reason or another were undesirable to the regime. 
And so after a few years, ruling forces succeeded in 'pacifying' the society. Leftist 
oriented strata actively and enthusiastically participated out of conviction in building a new 
totalitarian order, while others passively adapted themselves in the end. 
III. 
The first shock to deeply penetrate the society ruled by the centralist Communist Party 
came in the last half of the 1950s, when Nikita Khrushchev revealed Stalinist crimes at the 
20th Party Congress in the USSR. The first wave of criticism to raise fundamental questions 
of morals, culture, and politics swept through the country, with the participation of writers, 
journalists, intellectuals, those within and without of the Party. Still alive were the vivid 
memories of the shameful mass mock trials during the first half of the decade, which resulted 
in the deaths of about 180 communists and non-communists throughout the century. For the 
first time voices were heard demanding more respect for domestic democratic and spiritual 
traditions. There was an isolated appeal of the churches calling for a moral and spiritual 
renewal because--as was stated in a memoranda to the cabinet conceived by Josef L. 
Hromadka and his colleagues--the entire society had found itself in the midst of a deep 
crisis. The society which had been silenced for so many years was attempting to start a 
modest dialogue spanning across all the structures and institutions despite all the continuing 
pressure from above. 
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At that time, however, the regime was still sufficiently strong enough to swiftly initiate 
a counter-offensive. Tpis severely afflicted those from the ranks of heretofore loyal citizens, 
especially Party membhs, who had expressed criticism. The principles of the purportedly 
cultural revolution, w}fjch was to be consummated with a political and social one, began to 
take the upper hand throughout the society. One of its aims was to overcome so-called 
remnants of religion, and so the church was pushed into an even more marginal position. 
The leading motto became: keep the church from interfering with problems of soc1ety. 
Religion was proclaimed a private affair. No official documents recorded church 
membership. Atheistic propaganda increased, supported by significant contributions of 
money and personnel from the state. The only officially acceptable view became Marxism-
Leninism, and subscribing to it became a pre-requisite for anyone who sought a position in 
the field of education. 
This struck a sensitive chord for Czech Protestants in particular, who had highly prized 
education for centuries. Young people from Protestant families had traditionally attended 
pedagogical schools, on a secondary or university level. Ever since the time tolerance was 
declared in 1781, many congregations had set up independent church schools until the 
beginning of this century with exceptional teaching personalities with remarkably good 
reputations. In Protestant circles, the teaching profession was among one of the favorite 
career choices young people made. The same was true for the medical professions---in other 
words, for the humanitarian sciences in general. So when the regime laid down ideological 
barriers to entrance into universities, especially in the pedagogical field, and accepted only 
those who professed the officially proclaimed ideology, that meant the young people were 
forced to either accommodate the demand or to abandon all hope of a future in the field of 
education. The result ~as a blatant violation of human rights. While the teaching profession 
was accessible solely to those who had become members of the only legal youth organization 
and who were not burdened with "religious prejudices," it was forbidden to those who for 
generations had been raised in home environments favorably oriented toward that very 
profession, to those of whom it could be expected to possess superior potential for fulfilling 
the requirements of excellence in education. Of course, this was not theonly profession so 
affected. The practice had a negative impact on the whole society. 
One of the painful experiences of those years was that neither pastors nor church leaders, 
especially Protestant, resisted such manipulation. The oppression suffered by the younger 
generation in particular was wrongly termed the cross of Christ that every Christian must 
bear. A slight but significant theological shift occurred which deformed and obscured the 
notion of he cross. The correct interpretation of the oppression would have led to the only 
possible conclusion: mobilizing civic courage and protesting against discrimination, defying 
the violation of fundamental rights, without which the whole society would swiftly suffer. 
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Instead of this, the cross of Christ was transformed by means of a theological maneuver 
from the shoulders of adults to those of children, who were persuaded by their parents and 
pastors not to even attempt to study pedagogy. They were told it was better to make a 
sacrifice for Christ and abandon the profession they would have enjoyed, where they would 
have so effective in serving others. The result paradoxically appeared to be in harmony with 
the Gospel: the regime practiced discrimination, and we accepted it as the cross of Christ. 
This example serves to illustrate what a profound deformation of thought and position ·. 
continuous long-termed oppression can produce. 
Within the framework of the cultural revolution, worship was practically the only 
activity the regime allowed the church. This applied to such traditional forms of activity as 
adult Bible study, Sunday School for children, occasional specialized courses involving 
Christian services, youth, and so on. In small towns in particular, congregations were 
watched by a network of informers. On county and regional levels, state appointed "church 
secretaries" controlled pastors who were constantly under threat of having their licenses to 
minister revoked. Because all fields of activity throughout society were ruled by one party 
and its ideology, even the traditional forms of church life had to count on their church 
membership, especially if they were active, resulting in the disfavor of thee authorities. This 
was first manifested in difficulties their children experienced when they sought entrance into 
schools, especially at higher levels. 
But in the sixties when it was preparing a new law concerning the family, the regime 
went too far. As the proposed law was discussed, the opinion appeared in the press that 
parents were compelled to raise their children in agreement with the Marxist-Leninist 
worldview. There was even a paragraph which formulated the right of the state to take 
children away from their parents should they fail to fulfill the task the state and society 
required. It was probably due to this ambiguous formulation and fears that children might 
be taken away that about 30 congregations of the ECCB wrote letters of protest to the 
Minister of Justice. The most impressive of these were based on the reasoning that the 
acceptance of such an opinion would be harmful not only to Christian families, but to society 
as a whole, where freedom of conscience should be respected. Shortly after that, the 
congregation received letters from the authorities assuring them that the proposed law would 
be modified. The law as it was later formulated, stated that parents were responsible for 
raising their children in agreement with a socialistic morality; this appeared acceptable to 
those who had protested. They considered a socialistic society as a viable framework in 
which they could create ethical values from the position of the Christian faith. 
I have presented these two attitudes, one with a doubtful theological position in regard 
to discrimination and the other as civilly and theologically responsible, as evidence that the 
existence of Christians under totalitarianism was very difficult. Conflicting relationships 
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developed within their own ranks, and they had to reach down to the principles of faith to 
a penetrating reflection of the biblical message and its actualization. In this they were only 
partially successful and the results were usually ambiguous. The most successful attempts 
proved to be those made in Protestant churches where the presbyterian polity was respected, 
the last bastion of democracy which was suppressed everywhere else in the society. 
IV. 
The beginning of the 1960s brought the first signals of financial deterioration, when the 
possibilities of extensive development of the Czechoslovakian economy were exhausted. The 
development of heavy industry to the detriment of traditionally prosperous light industry, 
in which pre-war Czechoslovakia had been considerably successful, overburdened all our 
resources. In 1961-62 the economy experienced a negative growth iri the gross national 
product for the first time in its history. 
A new period of critical re-evaluation of the way things had been done up until then 
began. A second and even strm\ger wave of criticism within the society swelled. In 
magazines, theatres, research institutions, schools, and even in factories problems which had 
once been taboo were thought out. Reforms in economic life included revisions of those 
principles classical Marxism and Leninism had considered untouchable (property rights, the 
production of goods, the market, etc.). 
A dialogue was opened between Marxists and Christians. The former began to stress the 
anthropological dimension, which had held an important place in Christian theology from the 
very beginning. The foremost Marxist philosopher, K. Kosik, gained recognition for this iri 
a most pronounced manner in his book, The Dialectic of the Concrete. Other representatives 
of Marxism: Gardavsky, Machovec, Krejci, and others sought dialogue with Christians 
because they considered them their natural partners in discussions about questions which the 
previously politicized ideology had refused to deal with. The dialogue soon reached truly 
ecumenical proportions as both Catholic and Protestant theologians and laity joined in. 
At this point it is necessary to mention J.L. Hromadka, one of the initiators of the 
dialogue who had a profound impact on the entire post-war history of Protestantism. 
v. 
J.L. Hromadka was a thinker of the caliber few could equal in the Czechoslovakia of this 
century. His impact could already be felt in the spiritual and cultural life of the country 
between 1918-1939 when he markedly influenced theology within and without the Protest~nt 
church. He was co-editor of the magazine The Christian Review and belonged among the 
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scholars and critical interpreters of Masaryk's work. When it still appeared to the. Czech 
public that it would never recover from the wounds Catholicism had inflicted upon it 
immediately following World War I, Hromadka was already regarding Catholicism with. a 
positive bias. He recognized the severe crisis which was breaking out in Nazi Germany and 
the ill effects it would have on all of Europe. He pondered the deepest roots of European 
culture and civilization and in exile in America (1939-47) became strongly disturbed by the 
internal weakness of western Europe in particular. 
The domestic Hussite and Brethren reformation were a major source of his thinking, and 
he adopted the point of departure and method of so-called dialectical theology of Karl Barth 
and his colleagues. At the same time, he was capable of creative consideration of the 
emphases of liberal Protestant theology and so was a theologian of synthesis and dialectics, 
who realized that in human history a partnership of .the Gospel with culture is impossible. 
While in the pre-war period he defended the dialectic position; after his return home and 
especially during Communist rule he strove to promote understanding and coope,ration 
between the East and the West in all areas of renewal of the post-war world. At this point 
the synthetic position dominated; although throughout all his theological existence Hromadka 
was aware that the very sovereignty over the world of God's truth remains unshakable, 
leaving every attempt at synthesis under the judgement of that truth. 
In all of his inner make-up Hromadka was a man of the West, who respected all the 
values which the western democracies of France, Britain, and America had contributed to 
the world. The emphasis on the sanctity of the person, the creative initiative of the 
individual, rationality, civic and civilizational responsibility and political freedom are what 
comprise the core of western civilization, which is itself incomprehensible without Christian 
sources. At the same time, he followed with anxiety the disintegration of those values, which 
he witnessed from the convulsion of the First World War to the flimsy and inconsistent peace 
of the 1920s, and especially the social injustices in Europe. He found unsettling the 
feebleness of western democracies manifested in their relationships to Hitler's Germany and 
the Munich crisis. In Hromadka's eyes the depth of this crisis defied all political and 
sociological categories and assumed planetary proportions, as was soon to be proven in the 
conflagration of World War II. 
Hromadka carefully followed developments in the Soviet Union and reached the 
conclusion that only in the cooperation of the victorious forces could there be any hope for 
renewing our deeply stricken world. Just as transformation of the world order into a 
functioning community would be impossible without the values contributed by western 
civilization, so would it likewise be impossible without the emphasis on the equality of people 
and social justice which comes from the East. Without the former, the world would plunge 
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into an era of modern barbarity. Without the latter, social tensions in post-war Europe and 
other parts of the world would sooner or later lead to a conflict. 
Because Hromadka depended especially on Christian churches on both sides of the 
divided world to become the focal point of trust, openness and understanding amidst the 
gigantic changes necessitated by post-war peace arrangements, at the close of 1957 he 
founded the Christian Peace Conference (CPC). It was intended to be the place where 
Christians from the East and West who sought peace as the essential presupposition for 
solving all the grave problems dividing the world could meet together. 
The doc:ument Hromadka wrote in 1948 for the American council of churches is a clear 
testimony to his awareness of the ambiguity of the way things were developing in the Soviet 
Union, as he made no attempt to conceal his concern over the possibility that neo-Stalinism 
could prevail in the end and lead the whole world to the brink of a disastrous conflict. 
Nevertheless he still believed that a humanistic version of socialism would succeed in the 
Soviet Union which would cooperate productively with the western world. ·He called on the 
West to open itself up to necessary changes in its own domain (decolonialization) and to 
remedy its ailments in the social sphere in particular, where the do~ination of private 
property interests were leading to the gradual extinction of moral, spiritual, and political 
responsibility. 
After February 1948, Hromadka stood unequivocally on the side of the .Communists. 
Because his name carried a lot of weight in the Protestant context (he even gained the respect 
of Communists for his pre-war public opinion), he was able to help fellow Christians orient 
themselves in the first phase of difficult decision-making. Among Protestant circles, which 
usually belonged to the middle class, a general inability to cope prevailed and people were 
afraid of what lay ahead. Here Hromadka appeared clear and decisive, not surprised by what 
had happened. He counted on the active participation of Christians and the churches in the 
affairs of society in the long run, "after storms of rage had past" (Comenius). It was his 
belief that the question of the meaning of human life would sooner or later lead Marxists and 
Christians to a fruitful dialogue. Until the mid-1960s, he was convinced that socialism was· 
an alternative capable of bearing its own weight compared to the system of the West, which 
he blamed for not having learned from the debacle of the war, for not having perceived the 
depth of the crisis of civilization for which it was in large part responsible. 
The self -satisfaction of the church, both at home and abroad, bothered Hromadka. In 
his opinion its preaching and its pastoral and mission ministry were superficial, for it 
dissociated itself from those who were attempting to create a new order. It failed to 
challenge the political leaders and parties of its countries to be responsible, not willing to 
bear the guilt of itself and others, and thereby making the general crisis even worse. In this 
point as well, Hromadka proved the force of his prophetic vision. 
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Of course, his errors and failures cannot be ignored. In my opinion, it was a mistake to 
place a moratorium on criticism after the Communists became omnipotent. Although he had 
his reasons for doing it, they cannot stand up to deeper analysis. He believed ·that the 
offenses and failures of the church in the past in the social and economic realm were so far-
reaching that its witness in the new situation bore no authority. Hromadka felt that only 
·through repentance could the churches and individual Christians prepare themselves for a 
future participation in the areas of social responsibility from which the Communists had for· 
a long time--and justifiably--expelled them. His students in the New Orientation used to 
discuss this erroneous assumption with him, but nevertheless in critical moments such as 
the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the Cuban crisis in 1962, Hromadka maintained his 
loyalty to the regime and to Soviet foreign policy. A revision of his position was impossible 
because of the assumption mentioned earlier: his belief that a humanistic version of socialism 
would eventually prevail in the Soviet Union. We can learn here from Hroma:dka how 
absolutely essential it is to scrutinize with persistent thoroughness the phenomenon of powe.r, 
which deformed the socialist movement and eventually led to its defeat. It would seem that 
the Communists and even Hromadka himself understood power solely as an instrument. No 
matter how perceptive his warning about the idolatrous behavior of religious and non-
religious people may have been, he failed to perceive the utter pervertedness which always 
appears wherever people succumb to the utopia of the Tower of Babel and ruthlessly use 
power to assert it. Ever since the end of World War II, Hromadka had a tendency to favor 
those in power, as if in spite of all his bad experiences, he repeatedly made illusions about 
the good will of those at the top. I can recall how, as late as the Autumn of 1967, he and his 
colleagues in the CPC could not warm up to voices calling for reform which had been heard 
for years from all corners of our society. Hromadka was still counting on the leaders the 
establishment, for whom, of course, reform was an anathema. In spite of all this, however, 
I cannot conclude this passage without confessing that for a number of my friends and for 
myself personally, Hromadka remains in all his work--even with his "great" mistakes.:.-a 
spiritual teacher and a source of theological inspiration. 
VI. 
The so-called Prague Spring is known abroad only for the outwardly perceptible sequence 
of dramatic events from January to August, 1968. It was indeed the period in which reform 
efforts in the Czechoslovak society culminated. Socialism with a human face became the 
policy which enjoyed the support of practically all levels of the population. Historically 
speaking, it was the last hope for a renewal of socialism drawn from its essential 
presuppositions provided it would reach down deep enough from its fundamental ideas. To 
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reach to the sources which were at the birth of the desire for a society in which fraternal 
and companion-like relationships prevailed and where the mutual communication of all 
would take place without the elimination of competition and the alienating conditions of 
production. These ideas, essentially those of the Judaeo-Christian tradition, reached the 
fathers of socialism after a number of transformations, the most considerable of which was 
related to the Enlightenment and the bourgeois revolutions which characterized modern 
Europe. 
The attempt to humanize socialism began in Czechoslovakia in the early 1960s when the 
second wave of criticism emerged opening up all of society to a dialogue into which even 
Christians were drawn. By that time they had already discussed within the church in the last 
half of the previous decade the secular interpretation of the Gospel and were theologically 
prepared for an encounter with "the world." Included here, to say the least, were a Catholic 
lay-movement inspired by Vatican II and the "New Orientation," comprised of pastors and 
laity form the ECCB. In the latter group, where students of Hromadka played the decisive 
role, they did not cling to their teacher with any sort of imitative adherence but attempted 
to independently develop and practically apply some of his most important motifs (solidarity, 
civic responsibility, the universal range of biblical message). For the first time since 1948, 
theologians were able to publish in the secular press, and journalists and outstanding 
personalities in the fields of culture and literature were invited to lecture and join in 
discussion of alternative view points, as well as cultural and spiritual problems. This filled 
the atmosphere of society to the dismay of the powers that were. But even among them a 
diversification was occurring which culminated in the January election of Alexander Dubcek 
as general secretary of the Communist Party. Socialism with a human face became the 
political doctrine of the day. 
Alongside the idea of humanism, an emphasis was placed upon non-violence, a classic 
principle of one of the major traditions of our national history as expressed in the Brethren 
reformation, best elaborated by its spiritual father, Petr Chelcicky. Present throughout the 
entire Prague Spring within the reform movement, the notion of tolerance was evident. It 
was a tolerance which had little resemblance to cool apathy but instead took the form of 
promoting a dialogue where the most serious of questions were raised without any pre-
supposed answers. 
Once again the churches became conscious of their irreplaceable function in the life of 
the nation and society and resolved to bear witness to the most profound sources of pastoral 
and communal life. They attempted to break down the walls of the ghetto into which th'3y 
had been pushed by their oppressors, although at times they had sought refuge th~re 
themselves when they had chosen to adapt to the situation in an effort to survive. Numbers 
of Catholic priests and monks who had been forbidden for years to perform their spiritual 
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offices returned to the ministry. A sense of service prevailed among them which surmounted 
any feeling of injustice, and the will to forgive won out over the desire for revenge. 
Before it could bear its irrevocable fruits in all areas of society, the reform movement 
in Czechoslovakia was crushed by the brutal intervention of the armies of five socialist 
countries in August, 1968. The unified opposition of the population forced the Brezhnevites 
to slight scrapping of their policy, and for the first few months of the occupation, after their 
return from captivity in Moscow, the favorite leaders of the Prague Spring were still in· 
office (Dubcek, Svoboda, Smrkovsky). But by the Spring of 1969, after serious struggles 
within the Party, which had their parallels in the other structures of society, the reform 
movement was definitely defeated. Power was transferred to the Husak regime, which 
introduced a strict process of "normalization," where the ruling party had to leave its ranks, 
losing the leading position in economic, political and cultural life. The decisive criterion for 
advancement or termination of one's career became approval or disapproval to the 
encroachment of the armies of the Warsaw Pact. A new wave of immigration to the West 
set in. The violent enforcement of adaption and the repression of freedom of speech meant 
the death of personal initiative, demoralizing the broad spectrum of the population. In the 
eyes of the public, socialism lost all its attraction, once and for all. 
The Husak regime's largest problem was "normalization" within its own party. The 
revolutionary enthusiasm of the 1940s was long gone. Purges dragged on for months, 
resulting in the expulsion of around 400,000 members. Only after their own party had been 
put in order did they deal with other political institutions and alliances in the National Front. 
Churches posed a very specific problem for the normalizers, and here the process lasted 
longest, for the manipulators of party and state organs were unable to penetrate into internal 
church structures. Small Protestant churches (The Brethren Church, Baptists, Methodists, 
The Union of Brethren) reacted to the changing situation by retreating back into the old 
framework to which they had become accustomed before 1968, emphasizing primarily one's 
innermost spiritual life, repentance of the individual, and moral charity. The situation in the 
ECCB was more complex, for it had experienced considerable exposure in the Spring of '68 
as it had spoken out for reform. In February 1969, its highest legislative body adopted the 
"Proclamation of the Synod Addressed to the Nation," in which it defended the fundamental 
motifs of societal renewal from the position of the Gospel as they had been crystallized in 
the reform efforts. Its departure from the ghetto in the early 1960s had been the subject of 
theological reflection by the New Orientation, which matured into such practical forms as 
the open dialogue with political power and Marxism and the organized samizdat publications 
of youth and young adults on both congregational and church-wide levels. The pressure of 
normalization after 1970 began to concentrate on these very extended forms of church 
activity. 
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The authorities began their method of "slicing off salami" on county and regional levels 
by dealing with figures in key positions. Soon ecumenical cooperation among Christians on 
a congregational and parish basis were disrupted. The regime permitted it to continue solely 
at the highest levels, creating an artificially maintained facade of ecumenical relations which 
it employed to prove its toleration. 
From the early 1970s, the regime did everything in its power to push the churches back 
once again into their cathedrals and meeting houses, forbidding any activity which they 
might be able to influence events in the society. Official rhetoric was void of any mention 
of the positive contribution of churches in moral training--a· fundamental departure from 
the position proclaimed by the state when the Communists gained power. Christianity as 
such was regarded as a hostile ideology which had to be eradicated. The pressure of 
normalization had its way. Middle-aged church members in particular dropped out, because 
they still wanted to function in society. Unlike the situation during the cultural revolution, 
this time their departure was not accompanied by having a bad conscience. A secularized 
way of life, whether expressly atheistic or not, became much more "normal" during the 
normalization process than it had been in the early 1950s. 
Within the Catholic church there was an attempt to organize an "underground" church, 
alongside the heavily destroyed official one, with a strong laity, secretly consecrated priests, 
and a few bishops. Simultaneously, the regime was cultivating a peace movement of Catholic 
clergy called Pacem in Terris, naturally condemned by the Vatican, through which it wanted 
to split the church apart from within. 
A similar attempt to divide Protestants was made which even went so far as to employ 
the secret security apparatus. In systematic attacks on the ECCB, for example, it created 
through the assistance of state church secretaries on county and regional levels a so-called 
"agency of influence" from the ranks of presbyters and pastors, which was to intervene in 
church institutions, influencing the work of their administration, their convents and synods. 
The primary aim was to weaken the position within the ECCB of affairs of the church even 
after a considerable number of its adherents had their ministerial licenses revoked by the 
state. 
The authorities were attempting, with varying degrees of pressure--sometimes using 
gentle persuasion, sometimes outright rough--to force the leadership of the church on all 
levels to conformity with official teachers of the Comenius Theology Faculty, where young 
preachers of several Protestant churches were educated. The appropriate Ministry influenced 
the number of students who could be accepted and forced faculty members to expel students 
who had displayed a non-conformist spirit. Loyalty to the regime was the pre-requisite for 
foreign ecumenical contact for both church leaders and faculty members. A similar situation 
was created in the leadership of other churches as well as at the Huss and Roman Catholic 
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theology schools. The work of the foremost ecumenical body, for many years the Ecumenical 
Council of Churches, was inhabited in the same way. Here as well an "agency of influence" 
was at work, just as it was in other important church associations. The cooperation of church 
functionaries with the security forces, evidently compulsory for the most part, weighed 
heavily upon solidarity within the Christian community for many years. 
This painful lack of power to resist the repressive regime was manifest in Czechoslovak 
society outside of the church as well. Every facet of its life was inhibited by administrative 
manipulation and pressure, affecting institutions, companies and organizations of every sort. 
The sad reality is that the churches did not demonstrate greater spiritual resistance but let 
themselves become mutually divided, allowing the social dimension of their witness to be 
taken away, while all congregational and parish life was essentially limited to acts of liturgy 
and worship. For the most part this was undoubtedly the result of the continuous pressure 
of all the factors compiling such a system of oppression. Nevertheless, the internal weakness 
of the congregation and individual Christians combined to create a climate of submission. 
Here Christianity in Czechoslovakia stands face to face with a stain it will have to come to 
terms with for generations to come. Unacceptable is the excuse uttered almost unconsciously 
that churches in other parts of Europe where Communist rule was avoided would have fared 
no better had they been faced with oppression. The disturbing question remains: Why did 
the power of "the world" prove stronger than the spiritual power of the Gospel, which was 
publicly proclaimed and professed in houses of worship? 
VII. 
The period following the inception of Charter 77 represented an extraordinary test of 
political and spiritual maturity in the Czechoslovak environment. At the close of 1976, the 
basic document itself carried the names of 242 original signers: former Communists who 
had been expelled from the Party after Husak came to power, democrats, humanists, and by 
no means least of all, members of various churches, including several Catholic priests and a 
group of eight preachers from the ECCB. The number of Protestant and Catholic laity was 
numerous. 
The fundamental purpose of the Charta movement was the renewal of civic 
responsibility. Charter 77 was created following the publication of a number of pacts and 
treaties regarding civil, political and cultural rights, which had been incorporated into the 
laws of our country in the autumn of 1976. By signing the Charter, members expressed their 
decision to enter into a dialogue with those in power which would lead it to respect in the 
domestic sphere all the internationally valid legal norms. Chartists, who were striving for the 
unity of personal and civic life, were aware that preserving this integrity would require a 
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great deal of spiritual and moral strength. To rehabilitate the notion of citizenship as the 
responsible attitude toward the affairs of the community (polis) in a situation where the 
extent of moral, economic and political devastation was so grave was an enormous task. The 
difficulty of the situation was intensified because the administration of the country, the very 
ones who for the most part were responsible for the defiling of the whole society by forcing 
it into the appalling image of what for years had been called a "naturally" functioning 
conformity, did not seek dialogue in the slightest. All it was interested in was maintaining 
its own power, not in solving the crisis. 
One could have expected that the churches would adhere to the efforts of Charter 77 for 
a radical renewal, but not even they had been able to avoid onerous deformations which, 
along with pressure form outside, confirmed only their will to survive. Instead of a 
courageous witness and a willingness to support those citizens who had taken the risk of a 
non-conformist position upon themselves, under state pressure, the voices which could be 
heard from church headquarters expressed at best bewilderment and at worst dissociation 
from Charta members. As late as the close of the 1970s, when the activity of the first 
Chartists began, official documents of churches and of Comenius Theology Faculty (as well . 
as others) reiterated their opinion that socialism was to be considered a framework within 
which we as Christians can carry out our work. The post-Constantinian epoch, into which 
the church was pointed due to the fundamental changes which occurred in central and 
eastern Europe after World War II, was regarded as a more appropriate environment for 
ministry than the previous era. Under the new circumstances the church could allegedly 
depend only on the power of the Gospel instead of the privileged position it had enjoyed 
for centuries of European history thanks to the powers of this world. 
A deeper analysis of the phenomenon of "real socialism" and in particular of the 
absolutization of power which characterizes it was lacking. There was not even an attempt 
made to ponder more deeply the temptation into which the post-Constantinian church was 
driven. It may have been deprived of its powerful position in society, but it was vulnerable 
at the flick of a hand becoming a lackey to the power ofthe deprivers, a predicament even 
more seductive the more power the regime acquired. After the military incursion of 1968, 
one can talk about the kind of power which under Brezhnev's real socialism dragged citizens 
down into a dependence comparable only perhaps to those we know from the days of ancient 
despots. 
The work of Charter 77 continued despite the fact that it was isolated and received 
support from the society only in secret and most often from individuals. Gradually it put 
out through samizdat a series of documents in which it adopted positions on various social 
problems, stimulating within the heretofore silent and silenced society a discussion 
concerning questions that official propaganda either played down or passed over. Soon after 
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the original Charta document came out, rather intensive discussions began, initially within 
the movement itself, where it was not exceptional for theologians to be invited to lecture in 
surroundings where they would hardly have gone before. 
Such encounters transversed all confessional barriers. Shortly after that, a vast range of 
groups and seminars began to work together regularly on social, economic, and political 
issues. Philosophical and theological seminars took shape, and samizdat of all kinds was 
"published." Home theatres as well as unofficial art exhibits were organized. A second · 
culture was born. 
In this manner, for the third time in the short history of our country, an attempt at 
critical self-searching took place at all levels of life--personal, civic and societal. New 
concepts were born and an alternative to socialism was considered. We were witnesses to the 
process of searching for a way out of the prolonged crisis into which the whole society had 
been growing that it had exhausted all its energy. Its powerful elite was concentrating on 
nothing but preserving the status quo, which of course led to increased tensions within the 
society. It was plain to see that we were standing on the threshold of major changes. 
In this context, I consider it important to stress that these changes had been under 
preparation intellectually speaking for many years, and modest beginnings can be traced back 
even to pre-Charta days. The third wave of revision of our historical journey can be linked 
to impulses which appeared after 1956 and to others following the early 1960s in particular. 
Of course, this time everything occurred in an altered international context; socialism had 
been on the defensive for years and had gradually lost its attraction not only in Europe but 
also in areas where its success had seemed nonproblematical (Asia, Africa). And so the 
connection of the third critical wave with the two preceding ones was selective. It could not 
accept the notion of socialism with a human face because humanism and socialism had 
definitely parted ways after 1968 and after the invasion of Afghanistan. Notwithstanding, 
there is a connecting link in the systematic analysis of societal problems like the ones 
attempted by various strata in the 1950s and 1960s and by the Christians after 1977. And so 
one can say that Czechoslovakia was probably better prepared for changes ever since the late 
1960s than many of the other formerly socialist countries, although it might have appeared 
to the rest of the world that it was dragging incomprehensibly behind compared to the 
swiftness of change in Hungary and Poland and during October 1989, in East Germany. Our 
society, however, actually had the right to a time-out because the Prague Spring, and 
especially its preparatory stages in 1961-67, could be recorded as a heads tart in the pages 
of history as a considerable force for reform in central Europe. 
And what about the churches? How did they become involved in the process of 
intellectual preparation for fundamental changes in society? The answer is not simple. 
Catholics chose the way of seeking a new spirituality. As I have already mentioned, a secret 
34 
community of believers was formed, led by active lay people and priests whom they trusted. 
There was a strong emphasis placed on spiritual nurturing within the family, and Catholic 
samizdat literature of a theological, philosophical and general nature was of relatively high 
quality. Home seminars were operative where ecumenical discussions between Catholics and 
Protestants took place here and there. In 1987, a well thought-out project of ten-year 
renewal appeared, which was intended as the foundation for ecumenical cooperation to which 
Protestants were invited. 
During this period within Protestant churches, and especially the ECCB, there was 
obvious internal tension. A few other preachers signed the Charta, raising the number to 
about seven percent of the total 250 ministers within the church. The New Orientation, 
which comprised the largest number of Chartists (ministers and laity), became influential for 
the youngest generation within the church, a fact which made the secret security police quite 
nervous, according to their records. On the other hand, approximately ten percent of the 
clergy became collaborators with the secret police, representing only a slightly smaller 
amount than those in the Catholic church. 
The ECCB leadership, the Synodal Council, was under constant pressure from the 
authorities to isolate the New Orientation within the church. The rift between the leadership 
and Charter supporters from within the ranks of church membership grew following the 
spring of 1977 when a group of 31 ministers and lay people sent an extensive petition to the 
National Assembly, in which they had gathered material documenting the discrimination 
practiced against churches and believers. The ECCB leadership considered this a violation 
of its "competence" and issued those clergy who had signed it official rebukes. The synodal 
board of representatives, the legislative body which functions between Synods, approved 
the disciplinary action of the Council, but the autumn Synod merely took it under 
consideration. It has to be said that the rift between the official representatives of the 
church and faculty on one hand and adherents of the Charta on the other grew in a 
downward direction as well; the position of the dissidents upset the wishes of what was 
probably most of the church, laity and clergy alike, to live in peace and avoid conflicts with 
state authorities. The latter never hesitated to stimulate the tension even more by spreading 
around various kinds of fabrications about Chartists and supporters of the New Orientation. 
Gradually a mutual alienation set in, and except for a few exceptions, dialogue, which had 
still been possible in the early 1970s, ceased. Thanks to the practical stands it took, the 
leadership of the church did not contribute to the efforts for fundamental changes in the 
society. It cannot be denied, however, that it did try to preserve whatever space it had been 
allowed for its activity. The price was considerable; the contradiction between the Word 
which was preached and the way it was practiced in life increased. A number of students 
at the theology faculty and active lay people in congregations were dissatisfied with such 
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developments. And thus despite the ever more robust intrusion of the state into the life of 
the church, non-conformist voices could be heard, albeit if sporadically, at some of its most 
eminent gatherings (convents, Synods), calling for the fullness of the Gospel in private as 
well as public life. This position, of course, collided with the mentality of the ghetto into 
which the church's leadership, striving only to survive, was receding more and more deeply 
as the years went on. 
VIII. 
The November revolution of 1989 found the church in an ambivalent situation; a smaller 
portion of its members, lay and clergy, had been involved for some time in dissident 
movements, while the majority had decided to wait it out and avoid conflicts with the powers 
that be, whose interference into church life never diminished, even up to the very end of its 
control. As late as 1988, they threatened to revoke the state licenses of several ECCB 
minsters. State church secretaries in collaboration with the secret police and the "agency of 
influence" within the church attempted to push through the interests of the regime by, for 
example, preventing the election of certain people to church office (e.g the election of Jan 
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Capek to the Synod Council). Still operating were such institutions as the tamely 
accommodating Christian Peace Conference, designed for export, to the increasing 
indignation of Catholics, Pacem in Terris. The Ecumenical Council of Churches was also still 
under pressure, to which it conformed. All of these institutions were used by the regime to 
divide the church from within, as well as for infiltrating foreign ecclesiastical bodies abroad. 
The ecumenical community of the "First and Third world" was persuaded during various 
conferences by their representatives that in the global sense socialism was a viable alternative 
to a system based on market principles. Churches under socialism could allegedly fulfill 
their call to witness without great problems. 
The dramatic events of the ten days beginning with November 17, 1989, when special 
forces brutally attacked a peaceful and officially approved student demonstration, until the 
successful general strike of November 27, flung even the leadership of individual churches 
into action. Cardinal Tomasek publicly proclaimed his solidarity with the formation of the 
Civic Forum and on behalf of the nation appealed to the cabinet on the occasion of the 
momentous celebration of the act of sanctification of Agnes Premyslid in the Cathedral of 
St. Vitus on Saturday. November 25. 
The 26th Synod was in session just at the time when the revolution began. It readily 
reacted to the emergent situation and commissioned the Synodal Senior, Dr. Josef Hromadka, 
to protest directly to the Premier against the brutal police attack and to discuss with him any 
further measures. The Synod witnessed appeals for support of attempts for radical changes, 
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without which the whole society would be plunged into a crisis of immeasurable proportions. 
In the days that followed, the Senior himself became a deputy premier of the cabinet, first 
under J. Adamec, the only representative of the former regime who was willing to talk to the 
opposition, and later in the federal "cabinet of national understanding " of Premier Calfa in 
which Communists were in the minority. 
All spectra of society united in unequivocal opposition to the Communist Party and its 
government. Following enormous demonstrations in the streets of Prague and other Cities in 
Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia, its days were numbered. After ten days in which the 
nation's history swiftly strode through enormous revolutionary changes every few minutes, 
it became clear that our society had taken its earlier "time out" so that in the end it could 
successfully culminate those previous attempts at reform which had come to nothing, due to 
brutal interference from either within or without. 
It is remarkable that the gatherings of hundreds of thousands of people on Wenceslaus 
Square beginning on Monday, November 20, or at Letna on Saturday and Sunday, November 
25 and 26 had more than a merely political character. They manifested to an increasing 
extent a human moral and spiritual dimension and even displayed their own almost religious 
ritual. Often the "Prayer for Martha," a favorite song dating back to the time of the Prague 
Spring, was sung. It expresses the deep conviction that "after the storm has passed, the rule 
of your own affairs will be returned to you, oh people," an incomplete fragment taken from 
the "Testament of the Dying Mother of Unitas Fratrum" written by John Amos Comenius, 
the famous 17th century leader of the Czech Reformation, a pedagogue, thinker, and 
politician. Here in a pop-music tune was concentrated the desire of the nation as expressed 
by the last bishop of the Brethren Union! 
There were words of confession uttered at the demonstration by lending dissidents, and 
Vaclav Havel in particular, that we had conformed for years to a regime which had trampled 
over our dignity. As citizens we had lacked courage and thus prolonged the rule of darkness 
by our own volition. For years we had not believed that things could be changed. Instead 
of rising up to civic responsibility, we had been subservient. This was a public profession 
of our sins! On Thursday, November 23, when the foremost figure of the Prague Spring of 
1968, Alexander Dubcek, spoke to the people of Prague, many realized that they were 
witnessing a great moment of rehabilitation for those who had not forsaken their convictions 
even at the price of great tribulation. During such moments participants of the 
demonstrations experienced a moral cleansing. United in guilt from the past and yet in the 
hope that the end of slavery was at hand, we stood in the streets and squares staggered by the 
miracle of freedom we had been given. 
In such moments we realized that what was happening in the visible changes on the 
political scene had an invisible dimension of movement in human hearts and souls. It was 
37 
a dimension which had been awakened to the individuality of a life which is morally and 
spiritually integrated, emerging from. its roots in the Truth. It was as if during those days 
in November (similar to those days in August, 1968, when there was still the obvious resolve 
to remain internally free) once again non-political politics was at work, that unique spiritual 
heritage of our national history. It had been born in the Hussite and Brethren reformation, 
but through means of a number of transformations across the Enlightenment and the deepest 
levels of secularization, in November it was as if it had spilled over into the minds of those · 
who once again caught sight of the fact that there are things in one's life worth suffering for, 
for which one must assume the risk of peaceful resistance. Such a resistance is not 
determined by anger and hate but rather by desire for reconciliation and for a renewal of 
life in truth. The singing by the crowds of the "Prayer for Martha" of a forbidden singer 
during the normalization era, Kubisova, the confessing of sins as people and as citizens, the 
political rehabilitation of those who had been courageous enough to confront the violent 
regime on our behalf were all a manifestation of our standing in historical continuity of 
moral and spiritual struggles with those who had chosen the path of resistance against 
inhuman conditions long before our time. 
Perhaps I can dare to make the claim that this manifestation of civic resolve, extending 
beyond the means of routine politics or practices of revolt, was to a certain extent a co-
creation of the witness of non-conforming Christians as well as of those who continued to 
work in official churches, clergy and laity alike, who carried out their tasks faithfully, not 
dissociating themselves from those who had entered into open conflict with the regime. 
Many of us who had chosen the path of non-conformity experienced the power of 
intercessory prayer as well as practical assistance during the years we were forcefully 
separated from work in the church. A group of ECCB pastors who had been among the first 
to sign the Charter had tried to express this in a statement sent out in January, 1977. All 
those who conscientiously prepare their sermons, faithfully provide pastoral care, and seek 
out the ill, elderly, and desolate stand together in one and the same struggle with us in the 
Charta movement who are standing up for human rights. At this point I would like to recall 
the important words of the apostle in I Peter 5:9, that tell us that the brotherhood the world 
over is united by the same measure of suffering. One does not have to undergo the same 
risk, bear the same distress, but be united with others, despite all situational difference, by 
the same measure of suffering. During times of discrimination whenever we stood undivided 
in solidarity, totalitarian power collided with a wall with which it could not cope. At such 
times we had a foretaste of the future victory which was finally given to us during the 
November revolution. 
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IX. 
In the first few weeks after the revolution the church was faced with a serious problem: 
everybody adapted to the new situation very quickly and with undisguised facility. The 
walls of the ghetto into which the church had allowed itself to be pushed by the former 
regime tumbled down under the vociferous shouts of those who rushed without thinking into 
political activity in newly emerging parties and movements, of those who, as they insisted 
wanted to assist in national and societal renewal. I have already mentioned the fact that the 
Synodal Senior of the ECCB, Dr. Hromadka, was asked to be a deputy prime minister of the 
federal cabinet. Other pastors followed the lead and became representatives of Parliament, 
mayors, aldermen, and active members of various political parties. What was startling was 
not the fact that Christians, including clergy, became involved in politics, even many of those 
who had objections to such activity under the old regime, but that now this was happening 
for opportunistic reasons. By this I do not mean primarily for material advantages. To take 
up politics at the close of 1989 was comparable to the grueling task of weeding a field which 
had been defiled for years. Where I observe the opportunism was at the point where such 
decisions were made without having been critical toward the past; the most typical was the 
church's distaste for participation in public life. The New Orientation, which had always 
sought the organic union of the Gospel with civic responsibility, with work for the good of 
the POLIS, and not only for the narrow church community, had been the target of criticism 
for church leaders in the 1970s and 1980s. It was reproached for underestimating the value 
of congregational ministry and for concerning itself with politics. And now we stood amazed 
and watched how the very same people had rushed head on into politics without making a 
profound revision of their earlier positions and opinions. Former dissidents suddenly found 
themselves in opposition to those who were entering the political arena without sensing the 
contradiction between what they were doing and how they had acted only a short time 
before. They had not faced the overwhelming question of coming to terms with their own 
past where they had expressed more contempt for civic involvement than understanding. The 
Catholic church had a more deliberate approach to the matter; they forbade priests from 
entering directly into politics. 
Another problem which was dragged out in the life of the ECCB in particular is related 
to overcoming the mistakes and failures of the past. While other churches seemed to have 
accomplished the transition into daily routine without much ado, and Catholics have solved 
the problem of collaboration by their priests from a canonical standpoint, the ECCB has 
kept discussing these questions continuously at synods, in the church press, and in 
conversations on various occasions. The more radical group of young preachers is convinced 
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that it is impossible to accomplish the tasks which lie before us unless the church's deepest 
past--especially that of its leadership--is not brought to light. 
I myself agree with this approach and am convinced that what is at stake above all is to 
map out those offenses and failures which were contingent on the situation. It concerns 
political errors and sins and not any common human guilt. We will not be able to avoid 
certain mistakes and wrong decisions in the future until we elucidate certain stereotypes of 
mistakes and attitudes and behavior of which we have been guilty over the past decades. I 
have already presented the theological shift which occurred in the interpretation of the cross 
of Christ in my analysis of the church's position during the cultural revolution. I shall now 
offer another example to illustrate a particular type of shortcoming which can be attributed 
to the leadership in the 1970s. 
The members of the church who had sent the previously mentioned petition to the 
National Assembly protesting the discrimination practiced against churches and believers 
were not permitted to effectively defend themselves. In this case the church reacted in the 
same manner as political leaders toward their own opponents. The same practices prevalent 
throughout all of society were brought over into the church; attacks on anybody, whether 
normal citizens or prominent government or party officials could not be countered by a 
defense in the press or before the public. In the same way we could not defend ourselves 
against the official reprimands which were publicized to the whole church in a letter from 
the Synod Council. 
This is what I call political guilt, a situational sin. The practices dragged into the society 
by totalitarian power were adopted by the leading representatives of the churches where they 
were administered with the same zeal. Instead of a debate which could have been followed 
by the church members, disciplinary actions and punishments ensued. The potential partner 
was silenced and declared as harmful to the church, while all the while the highest 
representatives proclaimed their agreement at salient points with the "Petition of the 31 !" 
The aversion in the churches against coming to terms with the past is related to the 
phenomena which appeared in the first months after the revolution. Not just Christianity 
as a whole, but the churches as such were given credit for the mere fact that they had 
experienced the ill-favor of the former regime for decades. There was a well-wishing 
attitude toward the churches prevalent among the public, to which they responded--
especially the Catholics--with a certain sense of triumphalism. One could hear the churches' 
leadership proclaiming the time had come for the great rehabilitation of Christianity. The 
spiritual vacuum created after the liquidation of Marxism-Leninism as the official doctrine 
had to be filled. 
It is startling that in the delightful breeze of this historical rehabilitation the difference 
between sustaining and misleading traditions was forgotten. By no means can we succumb 
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. to the illusion that it is possible to transplant the Christian message into Czech society, which 
has been spiritually and morally devastated, without critical self -searching. The spirit of 
triumphalism has so obscured the minds of some church leaders that they have taken up the 
struggle to win the souls of secularized men and women without having repented themselves. 
At this point as well we find ourselves in the midst of an exacting discussion with the 
majority of the church which refuses to face up to the past and lacks the courage to take 
notice of its guilt. 
X. 
It is as clear as day that purifying moral and spiritual sources are essential if we are to 
overcome the long period of devastation, and it is just the churches and individual Christians 
and revival movements outside it who can contribute to the life-healing process. No matter 
how extensive the losses in economy and the environment may be, what is worst hit by the 
era of totalitarianism lies in the thinking and attitudes of people. The devastated countryside 
of northern Bohemia and other regions corresponds to the less perceptible apocalyptic. 
destruction taking place in "the hearts of men and the hearts of women," to use the words 
of a song by a Czech Brethren preacher, Svatoplak Karasek. We have before us here a 
corrective and reforming task which will last generations. 
One specific problem of Czech society is that the form of government has shifted so 
often in our nation's history. In this century alone the political order, with all its 
accompanying moral and spiritual implications, had changed several times, a phenomena 
which has rarely occurred in western societies. It carries with it uprootedness and 
discontinuity, opportunist behavior and a certain type of political and moral cynicism 
.. (Svejk!), a virtuosi ability to conform even in the most contradictory situations and to survive 
at all costs. All this is yet another burden we shall be coming to terms with for years. 
During the last few months the tendency to simplify societal problems has been 
dangerously on the rise. Everyone seems to have an easy remedy with which one can 
allegedly handle even the most complicated phenomena. Above all, there is a search going 
on for the guilty one, where the enemy who supposedly led us into this mess is revealed. 
Grappling with these iniquitous forces which can go hand in hand with partial knowledge 
and semi-education, Czech politics has its work cut out for itself in future generations. And 
we have not even broached the problems of Czech-Slovak co-existence, the market economy 
or environmental protection. 
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XI. 
The church is faced with new tasks in these changing circumstances. On the preceding 
pages I mentioned the overriding responsibility to review the past. This will mean 
overcoming the ghetto mentality at its very roots and not just drifting over it with some kind 
of opportunistic wind which prods us into political functions. We have to accept the Gospel 
anew with its universal message which touches all spheres of life, public and private. We· 
cannot tolerate such reduction of that message, as we did in the past, to include only the 
inlier life of the soul and the narrow community of the congregation or parish. The 
universality of the Gospel commits us to global responsibility. 
This immediately compels us to think about a truly ecumenically open theology. Today 
the matter at hand is the entire inhabitable world, OIKUMENE in the planetary sense of the 
word. This concerns a newly perceived relationship in nature, which is oikumene of living 
beings. At the same time, we must not fall into the trap of glorifying nature, which is 
neither the point of departure nor the goal of our faith and theology. All. of creation is 
headed toward a transformation. We are awaiting a new heaven and a new earth. Just as it 
is erroneous to cling to the status quo of historical systems, so is it wrong to adore the status 
quo of nature. Our task is to stand with it in a creative relationship of partnership and to 
overcome the demonism which would dominate and manipulate it. 
Christians in central and eastern Europe must not relinquish responsibility for the 
modification of the social system now being constituted following the fall of real socialism. 
In all the varieties of its implementation a market economy must possess a character of 
service, never becoming an end unto itself. It needs just as much alert critical observation 
as any other system. Based on biblical presuppositions, we must strive to bring into its 
structures the motifs of cooperation, partnership, and mutuality and emphasize the deeper 
sources of life. None of these is an integral part of it. We have to work toward these goals 
not only at home but also in the international context. The weaker members of our planetary 
community need our help as badly as those who are shoved into the margins of our own 
society. 
Churches have to understand the soul of the secularized person, who must never become 
the mere passive object of their mission and evangelical activity. He or she is also raising 
questions and presenting his or her own self-understanding, which proves that we are all 
standing in an open cosmos, where no one had definitive answers. He or she must become 
to us what we must be to them, partners on the woeful path of history where we are 
travelling with the hope that the groaning of all creation (Romans 8) will not fling us back 
into nothingness but onward toward new beginnings and the final victory. 
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Czech Christianity must see to it that Europe as a continent of countless traditions 
examines them down to the most intrinsic roots, studies them patiently and then illuminates 
those which overcome egocentricity and demonstrate an inspirational strength necessary for 
meeting the tasks surfacing before humanity today. It is also essential that we contribute 
to the birth of a planetary community for whose creation Europe must strive with the same 
enthusiasm that it displays in the construction of its own house. Here there is a role to be 
played not only by the largest nations of Europe. All of us are called to bring a specific 
contribution to the creation of a Europe which will not be a threat but a partner to the other 
continents. For Czech and Slovak Christians the renewal of Europe must be an outgrowth 
of the requirements for renewal, truth and tolerance of our own best traditions. Of course, 
this selective, difficult intellectual work which is no less demanding than monastic discipline, 
and the results will n_ot be evident for decades. A deep anchorage in the Truth is essential. 
Let us all recall with Jesus that "we have been born and for this we have come into the 
world, to bear witness to the truth"(John 18:37). 
Here lies the source of our strength and never-ending hope. 
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